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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF EVIL POSSIBILITIES 
Paul Tidman 
In this paper I defend the Anselmian conception of God as a necessary being 
who is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good against argu-
ments that attempt to show that we have good reason to think there are evil 
possible worlds in which either God does not exist or in which He lacks at 
least one of these attributes. I argue that the critics of Anselmianism have 
failed to provide any compelling reason to think such worlds are possible. 
The best the critic of Anselmianism can achieve is a stand-off of competing 
modal intuitions. I conclude by suggesting some ways of resolving such a 
stand-off in favor of the Anselmian view. 
At the very heart of classical theism is the claim that God is perfect. Anselm 
gave expression to this central theistic tenet when he described God as "a 
being than which nothing greater can be conceived."1 Many theists today hold 
both that God exists necessarily and that He is necessarily omnipotent, om-
niscient, and morally perfect. For the sake of convenience, I will call such 
theists "Anselmians." The Anselmian, then, maintains that it is not possible 
either that God should fail to exist or that He should fail to possess omnipo-
tence, omniscience, or moral perfection. In terms of possible worlds, the 
Anselmian view amounts to the claim that the individual who is God both 
exists and possesses each of these attributes in every possible world. 
There is an objection to the Anselmian conception of God based upon the ease 
with which we can conceive of very evil possible worlds. Theodore Guleserian 
labels this problem "The Modal Problem of Evil."2 Stated in its simplest 
terms, the modal problem of evil is the charge that there are some possible 
worlds where the problem of evil works. Perhaps the contemporary theodicist 
can plausibly argue that this world does not contain evil of a sort sufficient to 
preclude the existence of God. But surely among all the possible worlds, there are 
some that are sufficiently nasty. Nelson Pike, for example, argues that we have 
good reason to think that there are worlds in which God, for no excusable reason, 
brings it about that an innocent child suffers a slow and torturous death by star-
vation. 3 If there are such wretched worlds, the Anselmian view of God is incor-
rect. Some worlds do not contain an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God. 
It seems to me, however, that this line of criticism rests largely upon a 
faulty modal epistemology. In this paper I will argue that the evil states of 
affairs that would preclude Anselmianism are not in the least bit shown to be 
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real possibilities by their apparent conceivability or consistency. I hope to 
show, that is, that the Modal Problem of Evil is no problem at all, because 
the epistemological assumptions it rests upon are mistaken. 
1. Wretched Worlds 
At the heart of the modal problem of evil is the claim that there are possible 
worlds which contain evil of the sort sufficient to preclude the existence of 
the God of theism. Let us call any such world a wretched world. Guleserian 
describes one of these wretched worlds: 
Think of a world, we will call it ~, in which the only sentient beings whose 
existence is contingent are nonrational animals of various sorts-or are sen-
tient beings a good deal like the higher nonrational animals in our world-all 
of which suffer long spontaneous bouts of excruciating pain, and spend the 
few hours between bouts barely doing what is necessary to survive. We can 
draw the picture as detailed as we like .... Such a wretched world clearly 
seems to be logically possible, yet one that no divine being would permit to 
be actual.4 
It seems to me that if a world such as p as indeed possible then either God 
does not exist in that world or else in that world He lacks omnipotence, 
omniscience, or perfect goodness. The creatures who inhabit p are so char-
acterized as to be incapable of making morally significant choices. Because 
of this, the usual theistic responses to evil, such as the free will defense, or 
the soul making, virtuous response, and punishment theodicies, would not be 
available in this context. All of these, in one way or the other, require there 
to be creatures capable of making morally significant choices. Since there 
are no such creatures in p it seems to me that the Anselmian is committed to 
denying that such a world is possible. 
Indeed, one need not posit particularly evil worlds of the sort imagined by 
Pike and Guleserian. Consider, for instance, what might be called "the empty 
world"; a world in which nothing whatsoever exists, except perhaps abstract 
objects. This world is not particularly evil, there is nothing in this world to 
be evil. Nevertheless if such a world is possible the Anselmian view is false. 
But why should anyone think wretched worlds are really possible? The 
most obvious reason that might be suggested is that we seem to be able to clearly 
conceive of such worlds. Philosophers commonly defend claims about what is 
possible in this manner. Hume is the classic proponent of this sort of methodol-
ogy. For example, Hume argues that our ability to conceive of the laws of nature 
failing is sufficient to show that the laws of nature are not necessary truths: 
We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently 
proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea 
of anything, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a 
refutation of any pretenced demonstration against it.5 
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For a more recent example, consider Kripke's argument against the identity 
theory. Kripke argues that the materialist who holds that being in pain is 
identical to being in a particular brain state must show that we cannot imagine 
the one without the other. 
He has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine 
that there could have been pains without brain states .... So the materialist is 
up against a very stiff challenge. He has to show that these things we think 
we can see to be possible are in fact not possible. He has to show that these 
things which we can imagine are not in fact things we can imagine.6 
Of course, Kripke does not think the materialist can pull this off. Showing 
we cannot imagine what we obviously can imagine would require, "a deeper 
and subtler argument than I can fathom and subtler than has ever appeared 
in any materialist literature that I have read."? But why should the materialist 
even attempt this Herculean task? Why might the materialist not simply retort 
that in this case we are merely imagining something which is impossible? 
After all, conceivability seems to be a psychological notion having to do with 
our mental abilities, whereas possibility and necessity are metaphysical notions 
having to do with how things could be. So it is hard to see why we should suppose 
there should be any sort of tight correspondence between our powers of 
imagination and the modal facts of the matter. Why should we not be able to 
conceive of impossibilities? Just because we can picture or imagine something, 
why should that give us reason to think things could really be that way? 
It is somewhat ironic that Kripke should argue in this way since he is very 
careful at the outset of Naming and Necessity to distinguish the epistemic 
question of what is a priori from the metaphysical question of what is nec-
essary.8 As a result of Kripke's work philosophers today are much more 
careful to avoid blurring epistemological and metaphysical issues. But it 
seems not to have occurred to Kripke that the very same sorts of questions 
he raises with respect to the relationships between the a priori and the nec-
essary can be raised regarding the connection between the conceivable and 
the possible as well. The question of what is conceivable is a question about 
us, about our mental capabilities. The question of what is possible, on the 
other hand, seems entirely independent of such considerations. It is a question 
about how things can be, whatever the powers of our imagination might be. 
In this light, consider the conceivability of the sort of world described by 
Guleserian, a wretched world in which the only creatures that exist are gra-
tuitously suffering rabbits. Surely we can conceive of such worlds. Not only 
are such states of affairs not unintelligible to us, there seems nothing at all 
contradictory in the idea that they might obtain. But this, I suggest, fails to 
give us sufficient reason to think that such worlds are possible. One way to 
emphasize this point is to note that the Anselmian can say the same things 
about the claim that God exists necessarily and is necessarily omnipotent, 
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omniscient, and perfectly good. So, if bare conceivability were to be the test 
by which we determine what is possible, the situation appears to be at best 
a stand-off. We can conceive of wretched worlds, but we can also conceive 
of the impossibility of such worlds. 
Consider another example. In his book, Religious Belief, C. B. Martin 
charges that the divinity of Christ suffers from an irresoluble contradiction. 
The contradiction is: Christ can be conceived to have been other (that is, not 
good) than he was, yet as God it should be not just false but inconceivable 
that he should have been not good.9 
Martin's claim that we can conceive of Christ being not good seems incon-
testable. Picture, for instance, Christ hurling himself from the roof of the 
Temple at Satan's bidding. Assuming the divinity of Christ, is this a problem 
for the Christian Anselmian? I think not. Why should we suppose that its 
being a necessary truth that Christ not sin should render us unable to imagine 
his sinning? I think it remains perfectly reasonable to affirm that it was not 
possible for Christ to do this in spite of such imaginings. 
The Anti-Anselmian needs a conception of conceivability according to 
which it is uncontroversial that wretched worlds are conceivable, and which 
is such that conceiving of worlds in this fashion gives one good reason to 
think them possible. I suggest that there is no conception of conceivability 
which fulfills both of these desiderata. 
2. Consistency 
A tempting strategy at this point would be to abandon appeals to conceivabil-
ity and appeal instead to straight-forward logical consistency. Pike, for in-
stance, argues that the reason the Anselmian view ought to be rejected is that 
God's torturing of infants is "consistently describable." Consistency seems 
to avoid the vagueness and unwelcome psychologistic implications that ac-
company appeals to what is conceivable. What is conceivable tends to depend 
far too much upon human conceptual capabilities, whereas what is consistent 
is a logical feature of the claim itself. 
Can we consistently describe wretched worlds? One problem here is that 
of determining what counts as a description. "The state of affairs I am think-
ing of' seems to be a perfectly consistent description, even if I happen to be 
thinking of an impossible state of affairs, and "an impossible state of affairs" 
seems to consistently describe any impossibility you like. 
It seems to me that the most promising course is to drop talk of descriptions 
altogether and concern ourselves with whether the modal claim itself is con-
sistent. For instance, is the following consistent? 
(R 1) All rabbits that ever exist suffer wretchedly for their entire existence 
and these rabbits are the only contingent sentient things that ever exist. 
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This and other propositions which detail evil a good omnipotent being would 
not allow seem consistent. Is the apparent consistency of such propositions 
a problem for the Anselmian? I will argue that it is not. 
There are in fact three distinct notions of consistency which it will be 
helpful to distinguish at this point. One notion is what I will call "formal 
consistency." Let us say that a proposition is formally consistent if and only 
if no contradiction can be deduced from it by the resources of logic alone. 
What exactly is included in the resources of logic is a matter of some dispute, 
but that need not concern us here. For clearly there are propositions which 
are impossible but whose impossibility is not in any way a result of their 
logical form. The most obvious example is the familiar "There exists an 
object which is red and green all over at the same time." There is nothing 
wrong with the logical form of this sentence. 
Is there a notion of consistency on which the thesis that anything which is 
consistent is possible is not subject to obvious counter-examples of this sort? 
Certainly. Sometimes accounts of possible worlds are offered whereby it is 
said that there is a possible world corresponding to every maximally "con-
sistent" set of propositions. 10 The notion of consistency here appealed to must 
be stronger than that of mere formal consistency since, as should now be 
apparent, a set of propositions could be formally consistent and yet include 
necessary falsehoods. In order to distinguish between the two notions of 
consistency let us label this stronger notion as "modal consistency." 
Since there is a possible world corresponding to every maximal set of 
modally consistent propositions, a proposition p is modally consistent with a 
proposition q if and only if p does not entail the denial of q (where p entails 
the denial of q if and only if it is not possible for p to be true and the denial 
of q false). In other words, two propositions are modally consistent if and 
only if their conjunction is not a necessary falsehood. 
The notion of modal consistency renders the claim that anything which is 
consistent is possible immune to counter-examples, but only at the cost of 
also rendering it epistemologically useless as a means of determining what 
is possible. For to ask whether a proposition is modally consistent just is to 
ask whether it is possible. The claim that wretched worlds are consistent in this 
sense is no more uncontroversial than the claim that such worlds are possible. 
What is needed is some sort of intermediate notion of consistency-one 
not so weak as to give rise to obvious counter-examples yet not so strong as 
to beg the question. In order to characterize how such an account of consis-
tency might go, it is helpful to note a similarity in the above two accounts. 
In each case a privileged class of propositions was specified which was such 
that a proposition was said to be consistent with another if and only if this class 
did not contain the denial of their conjunction. In the case of formal consistency 
the class in question is the class of logical theorems whereas in the case of 
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modal consistency it is the larger class of the necessary truths. For the Anti-
Anselmian's purposes the first appeals to a class too small; the second to a 
class which is large enough but epistemologically useless. What is needed is 
a notion of consistency tied to some class of propositions which lies between 
these two extremes-one which avoids obvious counter-examples and whose 
members can be identified without first having to ask whether they are necessary 
truths. 
Only one candidate comes to mind that seems capable of fulfilling this 
desideratum. The kind of account I am thinking of would be one according 
to which two propositions are consistent if and only if the denial of their 
conjunction is not a "conceptual truth" or something ofthat sort. The problem 
here, of course, is to specify in any precise manner the privileged class of 
propositions here appealed to. Perhaps there are a number of similar but 
slightly different classes in this general neighborhood. By "conceptual truths" 
i had in mind those propositions which are such that we can make no sense 
of the idea that they might be false; whose falsehoods are inconceivable. For 
our purposes this rough idea will be sufficient. For no such notion of consis-
tency can do the work the Anti-Anselmian requires. 
Once again, to facilitate discussion, let us give this third sort of notion of 
consistency a label. When two propositions are consistent in this manner let 
us say they are "conceptually consistent." On this interpretation the claim 
that anything which is consistent is possible would seem to be immune at 
least to the obvious sort of counter-examples raised above in connection with 
formal consistency. On the other hand this notion of consistency is meant not 
to be so strong as to beg the question. If so, one must be able to tell whether 
a proposition is conceptually consistent without relying upon an insight into 
whether the proposition is possible. The most obvious way of working this 
out would be by appeal to something like analyticity. We know what is 
analytic, it might be suggested, not by insight into what is possible, but by 
our grasp of the conventions which govern language.ll 
The problem here is that there are propositions whose denials are not, in 
this sense, conceptual truths which are nevertheless not possibly true. To take 
some well-known examples, it might be suggested that among such proposi-
tions are some or all of the following: 
(1) Gold does not have an atomic number of 79. 
(2) All cats are actually cleverly disguised automata. 
(3) Hesperus is not identical to Phosphorus. 
(4) This table is made of ice. 
The Anselmian, it seems to me, should say the same about the denial of 
the claim that an omnipotent, perfectly good God exists in every possible 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF EVIL POSSIBILITIES 187 
world. This is yet another example of a claim which is impossible, though 
not analytically false. Perhaps some may be inclined to argue that some of 
the propositions listed above are not only impossible but analytically false as 
well. But regardless of the position one takes upon such questions, the crucial 
point is that on any sufficiently weak conception of conceptual consistency 
there will be some propositions which, although impossible, are not denials 
of conceptual truths. 
To see why this is so, consider how one might attempt to rule out such 
cases. The only way to rule out all such cases, as far as I can see, would be 
to strengthen the notion of analyticity involved so that it follows from the 
fact that a proposition is a necessary truth that it is analytic. But if one makes 
this move, once again it becomes just as hard to tell whether a proposition is 
analytic as it is to tell whether it is possible. On the other hand, if a weaker 
conception of analyticity is employed, like the traditional equation of analytic 
propositions with those which we can see to be true by grasping the linguistic 
meaning of the sentences which express them, surely the claims which have 
a bearing upon the Anselmian conception of God would be prime candidates 
of non-analytic modal claims. The result is that either the denial that there 
are wretched God-precluding possibilities is obviously not analytically false, 
or else the claim that they are is just as controversial as the original claim 
that they are possible. So the appeal to conceptual consistency has not offered 
any way of advancing beyond the original impasse. 
I conclude that in general consistency provides us with no means of resolv-
ing the dispute over whether wretched worlds are possible. We seem left with 
just the bald claim that wretched worlds are possible-a claim for which, 
thus far, no compelling support has emerged. 
3. ModaL Intuitions 
It might be thought that what is needed is an appeal to our modal intuitions 
rather than an appeal to the conceivability of the states of affairs involved. 
Although many harbor significant misgivings about any sort of intuition talk, 
I am sympathetic to such an approach. It seems to me that we can think of 
modal intuition as a belief-forming mechanism on a par with vision. Just as 
we are so constructed that when appeared to in various ways we are strongly 
disposed to form beliefs about the external world, so also when we reflect on 
various states of affairs we find ourselves strongly disposed to believe in their 
possibility or impossibility. For example, when I reflect upon round squares 
I am strongly inclined to believe in their impossibility, whereas when I reflect 
upon green-cheese moons I am inclined to think them possible. 12 Although 
space does not permit pursuing these matters here, I am prepared to argue 
that we are rationally entitled to trust such intuitions and that ultimately it is 
only through reliance upon such intuitions that knowledge of non-actual 
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possibilities can be gained. At any rate, one who, like me, is inclined to take 
appeals to intuitions seriously might suggest that our intuitions cut against 
Anselmianism. But, appeals to intuitions are notoriously tricky. What one 
person finds intuitive another may find positively unintuitive. For me at least, 
my intuitions are silent with regards to the sort of states of affairs described by 
the Anti-Anselmian. I have no clear insight into whether these wretched states 
of affairs are possible or not. Indeed, in my own case I find there to be an 
epistemologically significant difference between these two states of affairs: 
(R I) All rabbits that ever exist suffer wretchedly for their entire existence 
and these rabbits are the only contingent sentient creatures that ever 
exist, 
(R2) All rabbits that ever exist suffer wretchedly for their entire existence, 
in that my intuitions affirm the possibility of R2 much more strongly than 
the possibility of Rl. I suspect that I am not alone in this. To say that one 
has a modal intuition, I take it, is stronger than merely saying that one sees 
no contradiction implied by the state of affairs. It is to bear witness to some 
sort of phenomenologically felt pull or tug affirming the state of affair's 
possibility. Sometimes people describe having such an intuition in terms of 
"just seeing" that a state of affairs is possible. I think, perhaps, I would affirm 
this with respect to the possibility of R2, but not Rl. My intuitions at best 
provide only the weakest sort of support for Rl, support which is easily 
counterbalanced by the intuitive support for the possibility of the Anselmian 
state of affairs, 
(A) God is a necessary being who is essentially Omnipotent, Omniscient, 
and Perfectly Good. 
So I find in my own case that modal intuitions do not directly provide ade-
quate support for the Anti-Anselmian's position. I suspect that when others 
attend carefully to the matter they too will find their intuitions to be coun-
terbalanced, or at least nearly so. At any rate, for those who do, like me, find 
the data of intuition inconclusive with respect to wretched worlds, the case 
for the modal problem of evil has yet to be made. 
4. Guleserian s Combined Approach 
Guleserian attempts a more indirect appeal to modal intuitions-via the fol-
lowing rather complicated argument: 
I have seen an animal that was so starved and disease-ridden that it could 
just barely function well enough to seek food, trembling as it went. I can 
imagine a single rabbit-or an amoral animal that is very much like a rab-
bit-that is similarly starved and diseased .... I intuit that (el) it is possible 
that there be such an animal who is amoral and whose life is miserable. But 
now I ask whether there is any inconsistency in assuming that in addition to 
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this one animal, living in one valley, (c2) there is another animal living in 
the same or another valley. It seems that (c3) there is no inconsistency. So I 
conclude that (c4) it is possible that there are two such animals who are 
amoral and whose lives are miserable .... I intuit that (c5) no inconsistency 
would arise from adding any number of miserable rabbits .... I arrive induc-
tively at the conclusion that (c6) it is possible that (c6') there are a great many 
animals on the imagined planet all of whom are amoral and whose lives are 
miserable .... I further intuit that (c7) it is possible that (c7') the aforemen-
tioned animals on the imagined planet are the only contingently existing 
beings capable of being conscious, and also that (c7') is consistent with (c6'). 
I conclude 
(c) It is possible that there are a great many contingently existing beings 
capable of being conscious and all such beings are amoral and have 
miserable lives. 13 
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According to Guleserian each step of this argument is supported either di-
rectly by an intuition or is drawn from earlier steps which are so supported. 
In this regard he suggests that there are two different sorts of modal intuitions. 
"In some cases an intuition of a modal proposition affirms that a given state 
of affairs is possible. In others, the intuition affirms that two states of affairs 
are consistent with one another."14 Guleserian claims that steps (c1), (c2), and 
(c7) are supported by intuitions of the former sort whereas (c3), (c5), and the claim 
that (c7') is consistent with (c6') are supported by the latter kinds of intuitions. 
The remaining steps of the argument, (c4), (c6), and the conclusion, (c), 
are each said to follow from preceding steps. According to Guleserian these 
steps can validly be so informed since, "On any notion of consistency, if state 
of affairs T is consistent with state of affairs T' and T is possible and T' is 
possible, then the state of affairs that both T and T' obtain is possible."15 
Guleserian thus proposes a more modest role for consistency. He apparently 
recognizes the distinction between being consistent and being possible. Mere 
consistency alone does not establish possibility. Two propositions may be 
consistent with each other and yet their conjunction not be possible. Yet 
Guleserian's suggestion is that consistency can still be used to augment our 
modal knowledge concerning states of affairs about which our modal intui-
tions are silent. Consistency, on Guleserian's view provides a supplement to 
modal intuitions rather than a replacement for them. If, in addition to knowing 
that two propositions are consistent, we know they are each possible, we can 
safely infer that their conjunction is possible. 
The length and complexity of Guleserian's argument renders the task of 
discussing it a rather cumbersome chore. Fortunately a much simpler argument 
can be formulated which remains true to the central features of Guleserian's 
argument while dispensing with some non-essential details. For the sake of 
simplicity let us suppose that rabbits are incapable of making morally sig-
nificant choices. The argument moves from two states of affairs, 
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S I All rabbits have wretched lives, 
S2 Rabbits are the only contingent sentient things that ever exist, 
to a third state of affairs, 
S3 All rabbits have wretched lives and rabbits are the only contingent sen-
tient things that ever exist, 
which consists of S 1 and S2 both obtaining. 
Intuition would seem to tell us at least three things concerning S I and S2: 
(1) S I is possible 
(2) S2 is possible 
(3) S 1 is consistent with S2. 
Recall that according to Guleserian, on any notion of consistency the follow-
ing is true: 
(C*)For any states of affairs T and T', if T is possible and T' is possible and 
T is consistent with T' then the state of affairs that both T and T' obtain 
is possible. 
If C* is true, then (1)-(3) are together sufficient to entail the Anti-Anselmian 
conclusion: 
(4) S3 is possible. 
It seems to me that this argument embodies the essential features of Gulese-
rian's argument, (cl)-(c), quoted above. I will argue that this argument fails 
for reasons that will apply mutatis mutandis to his. Roughly (1 )-(4) corre-
sponds to the last half of Guleserian's argument. 
How can the Anselmian respond to this argument? If (4) is true then worlds 
like ~ are possible. I allowed above that the Anselmian should agree that an 
omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God would not allow such a world 
to obtain. Given C* and his commitment to the denial of (4) it looks as though 
the Anselmian must deny one of the three premises, all of which seem intuitive. 
Are these premises in fact intuitive? It seems to me that while the 
Anselmian should reject the conclusion of this argument, the first two of its 
premises should be accepted. Surely there are possible worlds where there 
are fallen moral creatures who delight in tormenting rabbits and are so effec-
tive in doing so that every rabbit has a wretched existence. If so (1) is true. 
Similarly, (2) is true if, as seems plausible, there are possible worlds in which 
rabbits are the only creatures and in which their entire lives are full of bliss. 
Of course, in itself, neither of these claims is in any way problematic for 
the Anselmian, who can allow that S 1 and S2 are each possible. The 
Anselmian's problem lies in the move from the claim that they are each 
possible to the claim that they are compossible; from "there are possible 
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worlds which include each," to "there are possible worlds which include 
both." According to Guleserian all that is needed to legitimize such a move 
is that the two states of affairs be consistent, the claim embodied by (3) and 
said to be given by intuition. 
It is at this point however that Guleserian's argument suffers a crucial flaw. 
Guleserian offers no account of what exactly we are intuiting when we intuit 
that one state of affairs is consistent with another. Apparently he thought this 
unnecessary since C*, he claims, is true on any notion of consistency. Unfor-
tunately this is not the case. There are quite straightforward notions of con-
sistency according to which two possible states of affairs could be consistent 
yet not be compossible. Guleserian's attack on the Anselmian fails because, 
contrary to his claim, his appeal to intuitions of consistency is either useless 
or question-begging. Intuitions of consistency cannot be used to supplement 
our knowledge of modal matters in the way suggested by Guleserian. 
There is, in fact, an obvious counter-example to Guleserian's claim that C* 
is true given any notion of consistency. If we interpret "consistent" in C* as 
"formally consistent," the proposition the ball is red all over at t (where '1' 
designates a time) is consistent with the ball is blue all over at t. Yet though 
both of the states of affairs corresponding to these propositions are possible, 
the state of affairs the ball's being red all over at t and the ball s being blue 
all over at t is, of course, not. 16 So, contrary to Guleserian's claim, C* is not 
true given any notion of consistency. 
Is there a notion of consistency on which C* is true? Certainly. the notion 
of "modal consistency," identified above, would render C* immune to 
counter-examples. Two propositions are modally consistent if and only if their 
c:onjunction is not a necessary falsehood. But the notion of modal consistency 
also will not serve the purposes of Guleserian's argument. It fails to be 
adequate for a different reason however. Whereas formal consistency is too 
weak, modal consistency is too strong. Recall that Guleserian differentiates 
between two different sorts of modal intuitions-intuitions that a state of 
affairs is possible and intuitions that two states of affairs are consistent. On 
the notion of consistency at hand, this distinction seems to collapse. Having 
an intuition that two states of affairs are modally consistent with one another 
amounts to the same thing as having an intuition that the larger state of affairs 
that includes both is possible. 
The problem here is that if appeal is made to such a strong notion of 
consistency the argument merely begs the question. It begs the question 
because to claim that wretched states of affairs are consistent in this sense 
just is to claim that they are possible. The argument's conclusion, in disguised 
form, is offered as one of its premises. Consider Guleserian's claim that all 
rabbits having wretched lives is consistent with rabbits being the only con-
tingent sentient things that ever exist. Obviously anyone who has doubts 
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about the conclusion is going to have doubts about this premise, if consis-
tency is taken in this strong sense of modal consistency. The two claims would 
be logically equivalent and the other premises would be rendered superfluous. 
Surely if we have an intuition that the third premise, so interpreted, is true, 
we also have an intuition that the conclusion is true. Putting things in the 
form of this argument does not help; it only confuses the issue. 
This leaves only conceptual consistency. But, like formal consistency, this 
notion seems too weak as well. This is because there are conceptually con-
sistent but impossible propositions, like "The atomic number of Gold is not 
79." But if there are conceptually consistent impossibilities, then we are not 
entitled to infer from the conceptual consistency of two propositions each of 
which is possible, that the conjunction of the two propositions is possible. 
Consider, for example, these two propositions: 
(5) I have only one wedding ring and it is made entirely of pure gold, 
(6) I have only one wedding ring and it is made entirely of a metal which 
does not have an atomic number of 79. 
Each of these propositions is possibly true. Yet their conjunction seems to be 
both consistent and not possibly true. 
If, on the other hand, one tried to shore things up so that there are no 
conceptually consistent but impossible propositions, it becomes just as con-
troversial to claim that a proposition is conceptually consistent as it is to 
claim that the proposition is possible. One might try to claim that if one 
"fully" grasped what it is to be gold, one would know that gold could not fail 
to have an atomic number of 79. In just the same way the Anselmian might 
claim that if one fully grasped what it is for rabbits to suffer in the gratuitous 
manner described by Guleserian, one would know that such suffering is 
impossible. 
I conclude that Guleserian's attempt to use consistency to extend modal 
knowledge fails. Indeed it would certainly be odd if an issue of this sort could 
be resolved by the kind of argument he proposes. Similar arguments could 
be offered with regard to a number of perennial philosophical disputes. Con-
sider the materialist view that it is not possible that we should exist without 
physical bodies. A Guleserian-like argument can easily be constructed against 
such a position: 
(7) My existing is possible. 
(8) There existing no physical objects is possible. 
(9) My existing is consistent with there existing no physical objects. 
Therefore, 
(10) My existing and there existing no physical objects is possible. 
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Does such an argument allow us to dispose of materialism? Of course not. 
Appeal to the putative consistency of my existing with there existing no 
physical objects is of no help. If the notion of consistency is taken to be 
sufficiently strong, whether these two states of affairs are consistent becomes 
a very hard question-no less difficult than the question of whether (10) itself 
is true. 
Guleserian's attempt to marshall our modal intuitions against the Anselmian 
position via his argument (c1)-(c) is a failure. If the notion of consistency 
employed in this argument is taken in a sense sufficiently strong to render 
the argument valid, the premises become just as controversial as the conclu-
sion, and can be plausibly denied by the Anselmian. 
5. Resolving the Stand-Off 
I conclude that the Modal Problem of Evil fails. Our ability to conceive of 
wretched worlds like Guleserian's world of suffering rabbits does not give us 
reason to think them possible, especially since we can equally well conceive 
of the possibility that God necessarily prevents such worlds from obtaining. 
The same is true, I suggest, for any putative evil possibility that would raise 
problems for the Anselmian conception of God. We can, like Pike, consis-
tently describe such purported possibilities-we can talk about them, imagine 
them, and so on-but only in ways that do not give us good reason to think 
them really possible. It seems plausible to claim that one's modal intuitions 
are silent or at the most provide only very weak support for the claim that 
wretched worlds are possible. Moreover, any degree of support the Anti-An-
selmian might muster by appeal to intuition can easily be counterbalanced 
by the support the Anselmian can muster for the claim that it is possible that 
a maximally perfect God exists in every possible world. I conclude that the 
case for rejecting the Anselmian view of God is yet to be made. 
Of course, none of this shows that the Anselmian view is, in fact, credible. 
Diffusing the modal problem of evil no more shows Anselmianism to be 
reasonable than the free-will defense constitutes an argument for the exist-
ence of God. Indeed, upon reflection it might seem that agnosticism concern-
ing the Anselmian view is the only reasonable course. For although one's 
intuitions may not be sufficient to establish the possibility of wretched 
worlds, many, I suspect, will also find their intuitions to be insufficient to 
establish Anselmianism. As far as intuitions go, we seem left with a stand-off. 
I have argued, that is, that neither the conceivability, consistency, or intui-
tiveness of propositions like 
(R 1) All rabbits that ever exist suffer wretchedly for their entire existence 
and these rabbits are the only contingent sentient creatures that ever 
exist 
show them to be possible. But the same might be said about the Anselmian 
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conception of God. Neither conceivability nor consistency can be used to 
show it to be possible that 
(AI) God is a necessary being who is essentially Omnipotent. Omniscient, 
and Perfectly Good. 
And for many, myself included, it may seem that whatever degree of intuitive 
support A 1 may have is easily counterbalanced by the intuitive support there 
is for propositions like Rl. It would seem that intuition does not come down 
firmly in favor of either camp. 
I agree that intuitions alone provide no clear-cut answer as to whether 
Anselmianism is true. But such indeterminacy should incline us toward ag-
nosticism only if intuition is the sole arbiter by which we can lawfully decide 
modal questions. I am inclined to question this assumption. Although space 
does not permit exploring these matters in detail, I would like to close this 
paper by briefly indicating two avenues by which the Anselmian view of God 
might be defended even if it is granted that intuition alone cannot provide 
the view with adequate support. 
The first of these would be to employ an "innocent until proven guilty" 
approach with respect to one's beliefs about what is possible. Some have 
argued that we are, in general, rationally entitled to continue to hold a belief 
in the absence of adequate reason to think it false. For example, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff defends such a view: 
A person is rationally justified in believing a certain proposition which he 
does believe unless he has adequate reason to cease from believing it. Our 
beliefs are rational unless we have reason for refraining; they are not nonra-
tiona I unless we have reason for believing. They are innocent until proved 
gUilty. not guilty until proved innocent. If a person does not have adequate 
reason to refrain from some belief of his, what could possibly oblige him to 
give it up? Conversely, if he surrenders some belief of his as soon as he has 
adequate reason to do so, what more can rightly be demanded of him? Is he 
not then using the capacities he has for governing his beliefs, with the goal 
of getting more amply in touch with reality, as well as can rightly be de-
manded of him?l? 
If Wolterstorff is correct, it would seem that the apparent stand-off con-
cerning Anselmianism can be avoided. On this view each side would be free 
to continue to hold to their respective beliefs on the matter in the absence of 
good reason to give up those beliefs. So an Anselmian employing this strategy 
might argue, "Although I lack any positive reason to believe Anselmianism 
to be true, I find that I do so believe, and so in the absence of adequate reason 
to think this belief false I may reasonably continue in this belief." 
The second approach is to avoid the stand-off by appeal to the theoretical 
strengths of Anselmianism. Philip Quinn has defended the analogous sugges-
tion that we can appeal to such considerations as utility, simplicity, and 
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fertility to justify our choice of competing modal logics when the data pro-
vided by intuition is indeterminate. We can, says Quinn, "be principled real-
ists about the structure of the world and practicing instrumentalists about the 
structure of our concepts."18 Along these lines, it seems to me that it might 
plausibly be suggested that there is a kind of pleasing simplicity to the 
Anselmian view. 19 A single predicate, maximally perfect, describes how God 
is in every possible world. Given the Anselmian conception of God, one can 
say how God is with respect to existence, power, knowledge, and goodness, 
in a particular possible world no matter how that world is specified. Consider, 
for example, an arbitrarily selected world in which fleas do not exist. How 
is God with respect to goodness or power in such a world? The Anselmian is 
always in a position to answer such questions, no matter how the world in 
question is picked out. In contrast, those who hold that God only possesses 
omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness in some possible worlds will 
find themselves often with no answers to such questions. 
Moreover, those who hold that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and per-
fectly good in some worlds but not others would seem to be unable to explain 
why it is that a particular sort of world with respect to God should obtain. 
Suppose for example a world obtains in which God is omnipotent, omniscient, 
and perfectly good. Why is it that such a world obtains rather than one in 
which God does not exist, or in which he lacks one of these attributes? On 
the Anselmian conception it is not merely a bit of good fortune that the actual 
world is one in which an omnipotent, perfectly good God exists-it is a 
necessary truth. Those who would say that such a being exists in only some 
possible worlds are left with a contingent brute fact that, as far as I can see, 
they cannot explain, that an omnipotent, perfectly good God in fact exists (or 
doesn't exist). 
An important qualification to the suggestions made in the previous two 
paragraphs is that these theoretical virtues I have described at best give one 
reason to prefer Anselmianism to non-Anselmian positions on which an om-
nipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God exists in some possible worlds but 
not others. There are, of course, non-Anselmian views on which an omnipo-
tent perfectly good being exists in no possible world. Such views would seem 
to fare equally well with respect to the virtues just described. Those who hold 
such a view can say how God is with respect to, say, omnipotence in any 
possible world. He doesn't have it. Moreover, defenders of such a view, like 
the Anselmian, can explain why it is that God is as he is with respect to 
existence, power, knowledge, and goodness in any possible world. Again, it 
is a necessary truth. However, against these particular non-Anselmian views 
the Anselmian has two important recourses. One the one hand, I suspect many 
will find that their modal intuitions may incline them to believe that an 
omnipotent, perfectly good being is at least possible. That is, while one's 
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intuitions may not provide adequate grounds for dismissing all the non-An-
selmian alternatives, they may nevertheless provide one with reason to reject 
the view which says that the existence of God is impossible. Moreover, the 
Anselmian has recourse to the whole array of traditional theistic arguments 
in support of the claim that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God 
exists in the actual world. Of course, anyone who has good reason to think 
such a God does not exist, also has good reason to reject Anselmianism. But 
one who antecedently has reason to think Theism to be true can narrow the 
debate to Anselmian vs. non-Anselmian varieties of Theism, and use the 
machinery suggested here to avoid a stand-off. 
The suggestions of the last four paragraphs admittedly call for further 
development. Whether in fact the positive case for Anselmianism can be made 
along these lines is a subject I hope to explore in greater detail in the future. 
I hope these suggestions are sufficient to indicate that agnosticism concerning 
Anselmianism is not rationally mandatory even given the indeterminacy of 
intuition on the matter. Defenders of the modal problem of evil argue that 
intuition alone (or conceivability or consistency) when applied to evil possi-
bilities provides decisive grounds for the rejection of Anselmianism. The 
primary concern of this paper has been to argue that this line of objection is 
without merit. The modal problem of evil does not provide good reason to 
reject the Anselmian conception of God.20 
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